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Catastrophes as Crime Scenes: Analysing the Legal Context
Abstract
Catastrophes are a powerful breakdown of our normative world, due to how they affect legal systems as
jurisgenerative forces and the negation of law they produce at the same time. In this article I discuss the
theoretical impact that the concept of catastrophe has on legal systems. To do so I focus on the
strategies of response to the consequences of catastrophes enforced by the legal systems, exploring
tensions between regulatory approaches and the guarantee of fundamental rights. In the second part of
the article I assess the theoretical framework developed by connecting crime scenes to the idea of
catastrophe. The analysis is conducted with reference to different cases such as the Bhopal disaster, the
tsunami in the Indian Ocean, hurricane Katrina and a particular case of man-made and criminal
catastrophe, the extensive toxic waste devastation caused by criminal organisations in the area of
Naples, in Southern Italy. These cases show the links between environmental disasters, the inefficiency of
law and the massive devastation of an entire area, which leads to different kinds of crime scenes from
those normally evaluated, for their source, their physical extensions and for the enormous impact they
had on local communities.
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Crime Scenes

Catastrophes as Crime Scenes:
Analysing the Legal Context
Valerio Nitrato Izzo

Introduction
Catastrophes have a strong conceptual link with modernity, even if
this is rarely remembered. Surprisingly, we can also trace a date for the
first general recognition of the importance of this issue, at least in the
western world. It was during the aftermath of the Lisbon earthquake
in 1755 that thinkers started questioning catastrophe. The immense
devastation caused by the earthquake, in a big and wealthy city such
as Lisbon in that period, caused an enormous impression and different
reactions concerning its origins. Two of the most important thinkers of
the time, Voltaire and Rousseau, directly considered the topic, but with
different approaches. Voltaire vigorously attacked the idea according
to which the world was assumed to be good because, as claimed by
Leibniz, it was the creation of God. He insisted on the contradictory
widespread presence of such evil and harmful events in a world
supposed to be good. On the one hand, Voltaire was lamenting the
fate of humanity suffering from the evil face of Nature, underlining the
difficulty of understanding the nature of evil. On the other, Rousseau
insisted on the human attitudes that call for responsibility in the
outcomes of the events, focusing on the part played by the social and
cultural context in an event out of human control.
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Here lies the challenge that the concept of catastrophe still poses
to us today, and probably more than ever. Rousseau’s view can be
considered to pioneer a modern social science approach to the topic
of catastrophes, for he acknowledged the role of the emerging nation
state as the main social actor in charge of a response to disastrous
consequences (Dyne 2000).

However, we can try to clarify the meaning of catastrophe
by emphasising its strong connection to the normative world.
Notwithstanding the fact that ‘law and catastrophe’ is a very recent
topic, it is common to find reference to law in disaster literature,
underlining the tautology implied in some legal definitions of disaster
as that which the intervention of disaster relief units make necessary
(Dombrowsky 1998: 14). The connection that recurs most of the time
is the one between catastrophe and order, which can also be found
in many definitions provided by international organisations such as
the OECD or by UN bodies. In this sense, catastrophe is an event
producing a subversion of the very concept of order itself (Douglas et
al 2007: 2). Religious thought considered catastrophe issuing from law
as an expression of normativity, sometimes in the sense of punishment.1
The liberal approach underlines, instead, that it is law that arises
from catastrophe and focuses on catastrophe as a breakdown of the
normative world. Confronting the law, catastrophe is Janus-faced,
juris-generative and antithetic to law, all at the same time (Douglas
et al 2007: 4). Catastrophes are moments when we confront the limits
of our normative world (Ross Meyer 2007: 20). In this article I will
discuss the way law shapes, creates and sometimes destroys such limits
when catastrophes happen. Public injustice, the responsibility of the
State and the possibility of a ‘state of exception’ are features that can
link catastrophes to crime scenes, as shown by the cases of Hurricane
Katrina, the Bhopal industrial explosion and, especially, urban and
toxic waste in Naples. Crime scenes that arise from such occurrences
can enlighten not only the response of law and legal system in extreme
events, but also the hidden logic and significance of the relationship
between law, ‘crime scenes’ and the catastrophe.
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Catastrophic Risks
Those events defined as catastrophes always demand an urgent response
from the legal system. For a better understanding and assessment of
the impact of catastrophes on a legal system, a conceptual framework
is required which links different elements such as regulatory techniques
and normative approaches. Governmental policies use law as a means
of assessing, reducing and controlling risk in a sovereign territory. It is
the very concept of risk as something that can be controlled by human
forces that recalls a normative meaning. Risk is a human creation,
depending on its perception, which is always culturally influenced
and, from this point of view, always relative to some extent, because
perception of risk can vary not only among societies but also within a
society (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).

Consequently, here stems an important question: what are the
features that make catastrophic risks different from other kind of risks?
Firstly, we should be aware of the fact that catastrophes challenge the
reliability of common risk assessing methods. Due to features such
as magnitude, uncertainty and possible irreversibility in outcomes,
the actuarial and probabilistic approach, typical of the insurance
companies, is weak when it must face effects that are not foreseeable.
Each risk assessment is a matter of classification, and it simply cannot be
possible without assigning values — in the broadest meaning — to the
outcomes (Steele 2004: 25). Modernity and the scientific approach have
always attempted to place everything under the umbrella of possible
assessment via calculation. In the ‘risk society’, it is the creation and
the distribution of risks in society that play a central role, but in a new
context where risks are, more and more, non-reciprocal. Due to the
complexity of the contemporary world, risk is not always under control
and many social groups are affected by risks that they did not help
create. The role of science is crucial here because it lies at the heart of
the connection between risk evaluation and decision-making. Risk is
not something ‘natural’ but it is always man-made; it is ‘manufactured’,
as Giddens states, through the development of technology (1999: 4).
Modernity has brought us not only a deep faith in progress through
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knowledge, but also a way of reasoning, theoretically well hidden,
regarding the dangers of our era. What is distinctive of catastrophes
is that we should always be aware of the possibility of the worst-case
scenario. This is sometimes called ‘catastrophism’ in the negative sense.
Catastrophes are events with a low probability of materialising but they
can produce terrible destruction and harm. Therefore, trying to calculate
risks by balancing security and action, using knowledge and technology,
does not represent the whole range of problems that catastrophic risks
pose. Beck (1992) has noted that it is not the probabilistic approach of
science that can end the discussion on the issues of risk. Catastrophic
risks are mainly perceived as potential risks that include elements not
susceptible of exact scientific prevision (for example the impact of
decisions on future generations). Here lies the imperfection of the world
and the gap between scientific and social rationality (Beck 1992: 30).

According to Dupuy (2002), catastrophism can also be seen as a kind
of metaphysics of the modern world. In our attempt to reduce, minimise
and sometimes deny risk, there is a common view that assigns to total
reduction of risk an inevitable abstention from action. Dupuy challenges
this view, asserting that the worst-case scenario must be taken into
consideration as a possible event and that to minimise catastrophic risk
does not mean a risk degree equivalent to zero. Inverting the temporal
order between possible production of the event and its taking into
account, Dupuy warns us that:
What is terrible with catastrophes is that we do not believe it is going
to happen, even if we have all the information about this possibility.
Once it has happened it will be considered inside the normal order
of things. Catastrophe is not judged possible before its coming into
existence (Dupuy 2002: 84-85). 2

For Dupuy, understanding catastrophe in an era in which technology
has reached the point that its use could lead to the total self-destruction
of humanity, needs this metaphysical clarification.

Until now, I have not distinguished between human-made and
natural catastrophes. This distinction was clear at the time of Voltaire,
but is no longer. Of course, it is possible to distinguish between an
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atomic war, a terrorist attack, an earthquake, or a tsunami. These
different catastrophic phenomena pose different problems and answers.
However, from the point of view of the effects of the catastrophe, it
is important to underline that there is not such a thing as a ‘natural
catastrophe’: all catastrophes are social, due to their effects (Acot 2006).
As acknowledged just after the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean,
this event could have been much less catastrophic with a simple and
economic system of alerting people to the impending disaster.

With regard to crime, the element of human intention in the making
of the catastrophe is evident, yet this aspect does not undermine the
social nature of the catastrophe. The extreme degree of harm of such an
event cannot be understood without reference to the failure of relevant
legal systems that allowed a serious negligence or crime to turn into
a catastrophe. This may be seen in the Bhopal and Naples cases that
I discuss later.

Approaches to Law and Catastrophe
The topic of law and catastrophe is, surprisingly, quite a recent one with
only a small body of literature that examines the topic from a general
perspective. Recent events such as 9/11 and the general terrorist threat,
the number of tsunamis and Hurricane Katrina, have had the effect of
stirring a new interest in the topic, especially within North-American
literature. Despite this, it is possible to ground some general points.

It has already been said that the immediate link between law and
catastrophe is the call for response. This statement does not mean that
law only comes into action when catastrophes have already happened.
Quite the opposite, law must face the challenge of catastrophe first of
all in the sense of establishing preventive strategies to avoid the harmful
event. Regulatory strategies can be roughly divided into anticipation,
prevention and amelioration (Douglas et al 2007: 6). Even if the
distinction between these approaches is not always clear, because of
the mutual influence between different regulatory strategies, it is useful
to have an idea of legal regulatory efforts in different branches of law.
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Anticipation and prevention seem to play the most important part.
This is hardly surprising, as catastrophes have this distinctive feature
of tremendous magnitude of harm if they happen, with subsequent
amelioration strategies implemented only after bad outcomes have
already occurred.

As the world of harm can be divided into criminal and civil wrongs,
regulatory techniques, as general legal frameworks, try to classify
extreme events into a kind of regulative grid typical of liberal legality
(Douglas et al 2007: 15). Such an attempt reflects the distinctive
features of different domains of law. Relevant regulatory strategies
for anticipation, prevention and amelioration in civil law can include
responses from a range of areas from administrative law to tort law, with
the possibility of including a criminal law component. Enforcement of
regulatory norms, norms of safety and infrastructural development are
administrative law measures that fit into anticipation and prevention
strategies. For as the focus of tort law on risk accomplishes a similar
function to the assignment of corporate risk through the doctrines of
foreseeability and strict liability, in the domain of criminal law the
content of such strategies varies from anti-terrorism policies such as
domestic spying, preventive detention, torture, to military strike and
regime change in genocidal regimes.
In civil law, prevention and anticipation are usually taken into
consideration under the form of foreseeability of harmful events and
can be understood as an assignment of risk to the party that is going to
act in a dangerous way. This is a more probabilistic way of reasoning,
near to the insurance calculation of costs and trade-offs.

The logic of catastrophe is difficult to reduce to this, because of
the immense and impossible costs of amelioration calculation (Posner
2004).3 Massive disaster litigation shows that legal systems are capable
of handling small or mid-size disasters but catastrophes in the larger
sense — think about Bhopal — lead most judicial procedures to collapse
or at least to show an important degree of inefficiency (Durkin and
Felstiner 1994).
The main problem here is not the regulatory technique at stake.
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From my point of view, the most important thing to understand is the
link between social catastrophes and legal strategies to identify the
accountable legal entity. My argument is that, notwithstanding the
general emphasis on a cosmopolitan approach, the State still plays the
biggest part in preventing harmful events from becoming catastrophes.
A way to assess the argument is to analyse the importance of national
legal systems in the criminalisation of catastrophes and in the
management of crime scenes that arise from such events. Beck (2003)
has argued that understanding and facing the challenges of a global
risk society means to leave aside methodological nationalism in social
sciences. His view implies that nation states are not able to face global
risks acting independently anymore (Beck 2007). According to him,
while authors like Luhmann, Douglas, or Foucault tend to focus on
order as the main perspective, global risk leads us to a kind of imposed
cosmopolitanism (Beck 2006). Whilst a discussion of the concept of
cosmopolitanism and all its implications is beyond the purview of this
article, I would like to underline some problems of this idea from the
point of view of the role of law and State in a catastrophe.

The policies and the decisions of a State have a direct impact, and
sometimes on the very ‘creation’ of a catastrophe when risks become
real. We can say, for example, that some catastrophes, supposed to be
natural, could have had a minor impact to a large extent. Hurricane
Katrina is arguably the best example. The inertia of the civil protection
system produced a clear demonstration of serious gaps in the ability of
the legal system to respond to natural disasters and other catastrophic
events (Chen 2009). The strategy was to ‘privatise’ risk, with the U.S.
Government abdicating the most basic right since Hobbes: the right
to life.4 This strategy had the effect of harming the most vulnerable
people in New Orleans and the region affected by the devastation,
prompting us to face the following question: is protection from harmful
events of great magnitude a duty of the State? To understand that this
is not just a matter of policy but also a question of rights, it is possible
to think, in terms of a prevention regulatory approach, of the right to
have an emergency plan provided by the local or national government
(Binder 2002: 791) and that such a plan should be effectively enforced.5
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Prevention in this way transforms itself from a regulatory practice into
a right justiciable before a court, as claimed after the 2006 earthquake
in Indonesia by Coalisi KPHY, an association of cause lawyers suing
the Indonesian State for ‘having not arranged any prevention measure’
(Bultrini 2009).

My argument is that social vulnerability, from the legal point
of view, is still, mostly, a matter of national systems rather than of
international cooperation. The Bhopal case gives us some evidence of
the conflict between cosmopolitan and national approaches. During the
night of 2 and 3 December 1984 in Bhopal, India, a massive leak of the
deadly gas methyl isocyanate occurred at the plant of pesticide producer
Union Carbide. The accident resulted in the killing of several thousands
of people among the local population. With its apocalyptic number
of deaths, still rising in contemporary times due to the side effects of
contamination, Bhopal is the largest industrial disaster that has ever
occurred. It has also probably been one of the biggest crime scenes ever,
if we regard this not exclusively from a penal liability standpoint but also
in terms of a wide-spread and unbearable injustice. From the tragedy
arose a long, complex, and still ongoing legal action that involved Union
Carbide, the Indian government and the representatives of victims and
survivors (see Cassels 1993). The case was the object of a long struggle
trying to set liability and have the case heard by a competent judge in
the US. The challenge for the victims was to assure a tort law system
able to award a just compensation, given it was uncertain which was
the best compensatory model: American or Indian. The case was, in the
end, declared under Indian jurisdiction while the Indian government
appointed itself as the victims’ exclusive representative. The Bhopal
disaster’s judicial story contains two narratives: on one side, it shows
that cosmopolitan approaches are limited and not always reliable from
a victim’s perspective; and on the other side, that the performance
of the legal national system is stressed by abnormal events and that
law’s promises in this field can be quite elusive, especially in tort law
(Galanter 2002).
This short summary of the argument should not be read as a call
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for a return to a strict statualism. Assessing risk from a legal point
of view surely goes beyond national borders. The development of the
principle of precaution doctrine as a general principle of international
law can be understood in this way, and not only for its origin in various
international documents, but also for the importance that it assumes
in enforcing a particular legal view, more attentive to the element
of prudence in legal theory (Papaux 2006: 220-240). Paradoxically,
the precautionary principle can be offended by regulation as well as
by non-regulation. Each regulation, including precautionary ones,
involves worst-case scenarios of its own (Sunstein 2007: 128). Such
scenarios, and the management of injustice they can bring, are still
largely under the control of single legal systems, as the analysis of the
Naples case shows.

Moral Journeys into the Land of Fires: The Evil
that Men Do
During the last 15-20 years, an entire area of Southern Italy, Campania,
the region having the city of Naples as administrative capital, has been
tremendously devastated by illegal waste disposal. During this time,
local bodies and the regional government did not succeed in organising
a modern, efficient and ecological system of garbage management and
disposal. The reasons for such a failure in the administrative system are
complex and probably out of this article’s scope. In any case, and this
is crucial for the analysis I develop here, the most important element
is that the absolutely peculiar mix of inefficiency of the administrative
and legal structures, and the role of criminal groups and local mafia —
camorra — established a perennial emergency that, even if led by the
national government through various legal acts, statutes and emergency
decrees created, de facto, a legal context for a criminal catastrophe.

At this point a clarification is needed. Even if most people
associate the Neapolitan trash crisis with the urban waste that filled
the streets, due to the ample international media coverage, there are
two emergencies that merge into one, even if they are just two faces
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of the same phenomenon. The first one is related to the urban garbage
issue, the fact that a complete cycle of garbage management was not
functioning and is still generally not complete. The second is the toxic
waste disposal directly led and organised by the camorra. The latter
phenomenon is not what is generally expected of criminal organisations:
we usually think about ‘classic’ crimes like international drugs traffic,
exploitation of prostitution, rackets and so on. From this point of view
the camorra was fairly far seeing: giving the word directly to the actors,
a member of a camorra clan once stated during an interrogation that
‘garbage is gold’ (Iacuelli 2008: 6, Commissione parlamentare 1997:
426), meaning that the drug business was not the only way to make
money.
Years of dumping illegal toxic waste, which was an economically
convenient way of waste treatment for industries based in Northern
Italy and across Europe, had passed without great social, environmental
or political alarm. Paradoxically, the Italian Parliament was well aware
of the situation, as demonstrated by official reports of parliamentary
commissions and bodies of inquiry (see Commissione parlamentare
1998, 2006). Unfortunately for the local population, the whole affair
soon turned into a serious public health problem. The toxic waste,
without complying with the strict national and EC regulations, had
been mainly disposed of in illegal dumps, without any concern for
environmental safety. Most of the time, due to the camorra’s power
in terms of social relations and intimidating acts, toxic and industrial
waste was buried in country fields. This practice turned out to be more
profitable than agricultural pursuits. It is important to stress that the
most affected area located north/north-east of the city of Naples was
called Campania Felix [Prosperous Campania] by the Romans because
of the extreme fertility of the area, renowned for its many local food
products. As all this seems to have dramatically disappeared, due
to a drop in demand for such products by frightened international
markets, many authors now call the area Campania Infelix [Unprosperous
Campania] (Iacuelli 2008: 1, Iovene 2008). Such massive environmental
devastation slowly polluted the eco-system of the area, resulting in
contamination of water resources and agricultural fields. As a direct
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consequence, the area’s important role in agriculture began to be
challenged, as many grazing animals such as sheep and buffalo started
to get ill. This was due to high levels of dioxin, a highly toxic chemical
compound, and other dangerous elements such as polychlorobiphenyls.
Furthermore, dioxin is not only toxic for animals but also for humans,
as it can cause cancer, malformations, leukaemia and lymphomas.
As strange as it may seem, for a long time the situation failed to gain
media coverage even if the beginning of the spread of the dangerous
effects was underway. Similarly, the public health authorities initially
refused to link the increasing rates of disease, as a specific causal
connection, with the toxic waste affair, also due to the lack of reliable
data at a medical level. Things started to change when, in 2004, an
article appeared in the prestigious scientific journal Lancet Oncology
(Senior and Mazza 2004). In the title of the article appeared, for the
first time, a sad way to refer to one of the areas most affected by illegal
dumps: the ‘triangle of death’. The authors gave this term to an area that
formed a triangle between the towns of Nola, Marigliano and Acerra,
east of Naples. The study demonstrated, using empirical evidence, that
in District 73, the public health code which indicated the area, during
the period between 1994 and 2000 there was a significant rise of cancer
rates. This was higher than the national and regional average, urging
for an investigation into the link between the hazardous waste and
cancer mortality (Senior and Mazza 2004: 527).
The hypothesis of the article established that the mortality of the
sheep in Acerra was being affected by the toxic dumping. As toxic
elements, especially dioxin, polluted pastures, the first victims of the
disaster were the sheep breeding in the area. The sheep ended up being
the first indicators of the disaster (Iovene 2008: 75), showing by their
deaths the presence of an enormous concentration of dioxin in the feed
and in the whole country-side of Acerra. Shepherds also began to die
from the high average of dioxin in blood, and this happened in a zone
without any significant industrial activity.6

This is only a brief review of a very intricate story. The removal of
such a disaster from the public debate in Italy is probably due to a kind
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of social schizophrenia mixed with a local and economic interest in not
uncovering the veil of ignorance under which all of this was happening.
Institutional reports and scientific studies did not become known to
the public until the last urban waste crisis that affected Naples and its
hinterland in 2007-2008. But, as we have seen, that was just one side
of the Neapolitan garbage affair, and probably not the darkest one.

Where official reports did not succeed, literature did. In his widely
acclaimed book Gomorrah, Roberto Saviano (2008) found the way to
give a comprehensive description of the camorra’s criminal empire in
its manifold manifestations. In the last chapter of the book, entitled
‘Land of Fires’ (2008: 282), Saviano deals with the toxic waste affair.
Magisterially reviewing what many of his compatriots tried not to see
and hear, he made a descent to hell into the mechanisms and the minds
that produced such a disaster, sweeping away the romantic image of
the criminal attitude, showing the rising professionalism and the strict
tie to the industrial and ‘official’ economic system. To generate such
a massive flux of toxic waste in a one-way direction from northern to
southern Italy means having contacts with an organised crime reality
that, in order to have access to the rich market of illegal disposal, puts
stakeholders and their technical competence in the first line to make
business as profitable as possible (Saviano 2008: 288). In order to gain an
accurate overview of the real dimensions of the business and its impact
on disposal needs, there is no better way than to imagine a mountain
with a base of three hectares, made of 14 million tons of unofficial and
illegal trash with a height of 47,900 feet: the highest mountain on the
planet (Saviano 2008: 283). But nobody is going to see this mountain
as it is mainly underground and a substantial part of it is incinerated
daily in this devastated land, as the title of the chapter suggests. The
visual element results in an aesthetic of a catastrophe, with garbage
fires all around, drums of toxic wastes left open in the country-side,
urban waste left on the highways.7
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Figure 1. A Ferrillo ‘A toxic waste burning in the Land of Fires’
© Angelo Ferrillo <www.laterradeifuochi.it>

The legal framework that has regulated the garbage affair during
the last fifteen years is an extremely complex one. In 1994, to counter
the chronic inefficiency of the local bodies regarding garbage treatment
and management, the Prime Minister declared an emergency state for
waste management in the Campania Region that was based on Civil
Protection intervention during natural disasters. This arose from the
region’s proven inefficiency and the environmental emergency that it
caused and was known as the Ordinanza del Presidente del Consiglio dei
Ministri n.195 1994. This was the first legal act in a long series of acts
that would set the legal framework of waste management for years to
come (for a clear account and review of the legal framework’s evolution
see Iannello 2007).
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The emergency writs that were issued year after year exploited the
legal accountability of the local administrative bodies. The central
government created a legal body called Commissariato per l’emergenza
dei rifiuti that, from 1996 onwards, would be the only legal institution
to have authority on the subject. Unfortunately, this administrative law
which was to be implemented as an emergency act for a limited time
was still in force throughout the 2007 emergency. The constitutionality
of these measures may be questioned because they became, once again,
extended by Legge n. 123 2008 until December of 2009.

However, the original aim of simplifying the bureaucratic
procedures in order to assist in the management of the public service
ended with exactly the opposite result (Iannello 2007). In the end,
the emergency became ordinary with all its possible and imaginable
consequences. The exercise of emergency powers, free from any legally
binding predetermination, did not solve the problem, but became a legal
and administrative issue in itself. The various legal layers that were
slowly added, ended up creating other bureaucratic structures, in which
no one knew what the others were doing, with an enormous waste of
public money, estimated at around two billion Euros. The most eloquent
image is the five million balls of garbage (ecoballe) that are stored in the
suburbs of Naples (Iacuelli 2008: 259). While they are there waiting
to be burned in an incinerator, they are still owned by the company
(Fibe-Impregilo) that was in charge of managing the whole process of
garbage disposal. The economic aim of the company was to gain money
from the incineration of such materials, in an industrial incinerator to
be built by the same company. In the end, many public administrators
— among which the President of the regional government, members
and heads of the Commissariato per l’Emergenza Rifiuti in Campania,
members of the board of administration of the company Fibe and many
others involved in the affair — were indicted before a Criminal Court.8
So it was not only the illegal waste management that ended up being a
criminal affair, but also an important part of the administrative action
enforced under the emergency law.
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Scenes From a Catastrophe
We can now focus on various aspects that highlight the link between the
catastrophe as a theoretical concept and its legal and criminal context.
What the Neapolitan story highlights well is that each catastrophe
carries a double imperative: one is deeply linked with the idea of risk,
mainly conceived as a general reflection on the probability of occurrence
of the event, and the second concerns the policies to prevent it or
weaken its social consequences. I would like, as an alternative, to follow
a different direction that places catastrophe in a more general moral
understanding of the event. What a catastrophe always brings is a break
in the legal order. Each catastrophe produces such consequences on the
legal systems that if the system cannot adequately respond, the social
effects of a supposedly natural catastrophe will turn it into a moral one.
This aims at a reconsideration in the legal context of the distinction
between intentional and unintentional catastrophes. Of course, it is
possible to distinguish between catastrophes such as Katrina, Bhopal or
Naples. However, only in the last instance can we find a clear criminal
intent that took place and that caused the catastrophe. But if it is true
that there are no such things as natural catastrophes but only social
ones, when we look at the consequences and social vulnerability (Chen
2009: 4) the differences are less clear. In New Orleans, when the State
failed to protect its citizens by giving them adequate assistance before
and after the arrival of Hurricane Katrina, in the same way the national
and local governments failed completely to prevent the daily crimes
committed in that country. This shows that politics and law are closely
bound up in the making of a catastrophe, and that from this point of
view the same concept of foreseeability must be necessarily connected
with the actions of institutions and governments.
Catastrophes are not only a challenge to the role law ordinarily
plays in our societies, but they show the real effects of policy choices
in a legal system. The most impressive thing about Katrina’s impact is
the recognition that some individuals, belonging to identifiable classes
and minorities, were not taken into consideration by the law and its
institutions, as they were classified just as ‘without means to evacuate’,
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without even asking who should have organised such means (Davis
2005). We can consider such moments as comprising a tremendous
legal epiphany in which, by stressing the limits of our normative world,
we can more profoundly comprehend the way law really works or what
goods and values it protects. That is, the poor and vulnerable in New
Orleans were not perceived to be as deserving of the same level of
protection from the catastrophe as others.
The schizophrenic attitude of law facing catastrophe is particularly
well shown by the centrality of criminal law, instead of a legal paradigm
focused on civil law and preventive practices. In the wake of Katrina,
the absence of law was evident, as most vulnerable people lacked
assistance. It seems a common feature among the cases of Katrina,
Bhopal and Naples that the law abandoned victims to their fate, leaving
them alone in a scenario which was out of their control. Nevertheless,
in this situation law claimed indispensability in assuring order. The
projection of traditional crime attitudes and biases regarding crimes
committed during the catastrophe was initiated by introducing a false
memory of crime related to the event (Simon 2007). A new model of
disaster management emerged, centred on fusing natural elements such
as floods or earthquakes with violent criminality and terrorism, with the
risk of a growing amount of coercive law enforced by the State and local
authorities (Simon 2007: 15). After its breaking impact on the legal
system, the law tries to exploit and colonise catastrophe (Meyer 2007:
21), trying to avoid recognition of the particularity of the situation.
As the analysis of concepts such as looting during catastrophes seems
to confirm (Green 2007), criminal law aims firstly at reaffirming the
coercive power of the State as if the catastrophe had not happened,
so that the law continues to operate normally, through ordinary legal
categories, even in exceptional conditions, which the very same law
helped create. The ‘shoot on sight’ order against looters shows the
attempts of the law to reaffirm its authority, even in a time in which the
law seems to have been depleted by events apparently out of its control.
The case of toxic waste in Naples is, nevertheless, slightly different
from other catastrophes such as Katrina, the 2004 Tsunami or Bhopal.
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The first objection that can be raised is that the toxic waste affair
is anything but natural: that it should not be considered a natural
catastrophe but rather an intentional one, in which the consequences
were directly human-agency driven. I would like to argue that this
point is not as relevant as it may seem at first sight. To do so I wish
to introduce some distinctions between intentional and unintentional
catastrophes. According to Posner it is possible to distinguish between
catastrophes by classifying catastrophic risks in four classes, the fourth
one regarding deliberately perpetrated catastrophes such as bio, cyber
and technological terrorism, or nuclear winter (Posner 2004: 12). Other
‘unintentional’ catastrophes which are man-made, are classified into
a third category, comprising global warming, exhaustion of natural
resources, loss of biodiversity and so on. Since Posner’s classification
is designed to fit the cost-benefit analysis as the main assessment tool
of catastrophic risk, he seems to regard natural catastrophes as not
deeply influenced by human agency. This may be true for an asteroid
collision, an extreme case in which there is probably not much sense
in worrying about social vulnerability. But in all the other cases I
think that cost-benefit analysis underestimates the aspect of social
vulnerability as it focuses on the value we are willing to pay to avoid
risk rather than the meaning in terms of impact these risks have in our
lives, especially once they come, unfortunately, into existence. Similarly
to Posner, Beck also distinguishes between intended and unintended
catastrophes. The difference here lies in the fact that while side effect
catastrophes, as unintended, are a mixture of bad and good (eg global
warming), intentional ones (such as terrorist attacks) have no benefits
(Beck 2009: 77). Even if Beck is aware of the fact that intended and
unintended catastrophes can reinforce one another, the consequence,
for him, is to stress the cosmopolitan dimension of the catastrophe,
underlying the insufficiency of the national dimension. Putting the
accent on social vulnerability means to be aware of the fact that, from
a legal point of view, the State still plays a central role, and this is even
clearer in a typical sovereign field such as criminal law.
That a certain criminal action is voluntary does not mean that we
cannot frame such an action as a catastrophe. To do so, we should
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consider another dimension of the catastrophe, that cannot be captured
by cost-benefit analyses as it is impossible to assign an economic value
to the moral dimension of justice. As Shklar (1990) has remarked,
what is at stake in the relationship between citizens and catastrophes
is the government’s answer to the threat posed by the event. Also,
according to Shklar, the distinction between misfortune and injustice,
more than a cultural one, is clearly political. From this perspective, it is
demanded that public servants not be ‘passively unjust’ and instead act
to prevent or alleviate the consequences (Shklar 1990: 56). If we give
a voice to the victims of governmental inertia, like in New Orleans,
Bhopal or Naples, we are going to assign a political function to the sense
of injustice: what began as a natural disaster was, in its full effects, a
public injustice (Shklar 1990: 3). This claim implies a solidaristic view
of the community in which each individual has a moral responsibility
towards the other in order to avoid passive injustice, the refusal of both
officials and private citizens to prevent acts of wrongdoing when they
could and should do so (Shklar 1990: 5).

This is exactly the case of the toxic waste affair in and around
Naples. During the whole period of criminal activity, public institutions
completely failed to assure control of the territory in order to avoid
the environmental and health disaster. But in the complex social
structures in the zones controlled by criminal forces and camorra clans,
many citizens were involved, at least as ‘passively unjust’ according to
their negligence, or their conspiracy of silence. The very idea of public
injustice helps us to consider that in the whole process there has been
a collective denial of the catastrophe (Ross Meyer 2007: 22), without
considering the consequences that were going to affect the whole
community, and without making any distinction between victims
and executioners. The transformation of the crisis into an emergency
where legal responsibility was weakened time after time caused a loss of
faith in law and institutions by the affected people. The victims’ group,
whose numbers reached one million people (Iacuelli 2008: 275), was
condemned to having their feelings of injustice ignored as a result of
the legal and social negation of the catastrophe. The belief was widely
held that no one was able to defend them from such aggression, due to
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the incapacity of public institutions to set up a framework of prevention
and control of criminal activities in their territory.

Understanding the implication of the assumption that catastrophes
are both jurisgenerative and a negation of the law at the same time
(Douglas et al 2007: 4) involves trying to combine these two elements
in the analysis. The idea of a state of exception captures both concepts
well. The link between states of exception and catastrophes has been
recently discussed by Beck, who argued that dealing with catastrophic
risks means being aware of a planetary state of exception that cannot be
afforded at a national level (Beck 2009: 76). He argued that risk is the
anticipation of catastrophe, but in order to have an idea of the meaning
of the global dimension of the catastrophe we need to question the
staging of the catastrophe, which fills the gap between the anticipated
catastrophe and the actual one (Beck 2009: 10, 67). It is the symbolic
dimension that transforms a local event into a cosmopolitan and global
one. The global media coverage helps to assign a common meaning to
the sense of catastrophe, as has happened with terrorist attacks. In this
way, the catastrophe has meaning for us; it can capture our attention
even if it has happened far from us. The staging of the catastrophe also
underlines another dimension: the fact that by coming into existence
it reminds us of the effective representation of what we tried to avoid
just by assigning it a risk. Understanding catastrophe is possible only
through its staging, exactly because, with the coming of modernity,
we removed the very idea of the occurrence of the catastrophe (Dupuy
2002).
The aesthetic that results from the catastrophe is a powerful
threat to the authority and reputation of the State. The staging of the
catastrophe casts a vigorous light on legal failures and inefficiencies.
Crime scenes can play different roles with regard to this aspect. They
can be the representation of an order to be re-established — as in the
case of Katrina — with vulnerable people targeted as criminals, giving
the opportunity to picture law and legal order as a means to come out
of the catastrophe, denying the role they played in its creation. They
can tragically show for a long period the effects that negligence and
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the absence of prevention caused, having the function of a perpetual
reminder of inflicted pain, as in the Bhopal case. Or they can, as in
the Naples case, be the representation of a prolonged and unresolved
crime scene that, with its perpetual scandal, is a powerful threat to
legal legitimacy and thus must be removed and hidden from the public
sphere.

While Beck’s approach to the link between catastrophe and state of
exception through the staging of the catastrophe is a cosmopolitan one,
there is no need to hold his cosmopolitan view to affirm the spreading
of the state of exception. According to Agamben, the state of exception
has been replaced by a generalisation of the paradigm of security as the
normal technique of government in Western societies (Agamben 2005:
14). In Agamben’s view, the role of the nation state is still powerful
in determining the extension of the law, and for this reason it is more
useful in understanding what the staging of the catastrophe means for
legal structures. The crucial role played by criminal law in the making
of a state of exception during a catastrophe can be well exemplified by
the fate of many detainees in the aftermath of Katrina. Most of them
were left without any legal assistance for weeks, as they were moved
from jail to jail around the zone affected by the hurricane. As a study
reports, many of them would not have been in prison if only they had
not been deprived of legal assistance (Metzger 2007).
Focusing now on the Neapolitan affair, we are able to explore an
example of the theoretical category of ‘state of exception’ in real life.
What renders it really similar to a permanent state of exception is,
first of all, the legal framework that governed the territory affected by
the garbage emergency. The exercise of emergency powers exploited,
on a legal basis, the local bodies of any administrative competence on
subjects that were under their control. Little by little, writ after writ, a
large part of the Campania region was governed by a law that citizens
could not participate in, as the administrative forms of individuals’
participation in the decision-making procedure were suspended,
together with an enormous body of legislation of primary importance
to the Italian legal system (see Legge n.123 2008 section 18). At the
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same time, for the purpose of removing garbage from the streets,
dangerous waste of industrial or pharmaceutical origin was stored in
the same dump as urban and normal garbage, deviating from national,
and probably EC, laws (Legge n. 123 2008 section 9).

This state of things also affected the judicial organisation: a
unique jurisdiction of the Naples court became competent to try all
criminal cases regarding violation of laws for waste treatment in the
whole region of Campania (Legge n. 123 2008 section 3); and with
specific crimes only punishable in the area, achieving the result of
an unprecedented fragmentation of the penal law (Legge n. 210 2008
section 6). The representation of a state of exception is well exemplified
by the government’s decision to use military forces to patrol and keep
under surveillance the sites chosen to host the dumps managed under
the exceptional laws mentioned above. The presence of military forces
serves as the visualisation of State power in the eyes of the community,
with the aim of deterring grass-roots movements from demonstrating
and protesting. With this body of rules, the state of exception became
the way the law reaffirmed its pretence of order and control, even
against itself, as the suspension of the law must be necessary for the
common good.
This is, of course, the institutional side of the state of exception.
Here it is not possible to deal, for example, with the complex system of
intimidation, fear, and corruption by which the camorra dominates the
local population, imposing its business and often killing the resistant.
What the toxic waste affair shows in the relationship between the state
of exception and the crime scenes caused by catastrophes is that the
moral meaning of a catastrophe cannot be fully understood without
taking into serious account how the legal system and its structure react
against the stress of harmful events, intentional or unintentional as
they may be.
As we have seen, legal institutions are always connected to the
making of a catastrophe. This view challenges the traditional and
established view of law as a primary means to assure order. The hard
question to answer here is whether it is possible that law contributes to
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disorder and irresponsibility, rather than order and responsibility. In
his last thought-provoking book, Scott Veitch has argued precisely this
point: that the legal system can be (legally) involved in the production
of irresponsibility (Veitch 2007: 3). Veitch lucidly shows that the rise of
the division of labour in organising responsibility within multiple roles
and institutions has irresponsibility as the overall effect of these features
and their proliferation (Veitch 2007: 49). The Neapolitan case shows
how this theoretical framework can find an empirical confirmation
in a particular legal system, even a civil law one. In this sense, law
just becomes a way of organising irresponsibilities and legitimising
immunities (Veitch 2007: 72). The law has therefore the privilege to
define its peculiar epistemological status, carrying with it the danger
of auto-referentiality. If it is the law itself that establishes that the law
has been suspended and that it is possible to act against the law during
this time, in a kind of anomy, this is the state of exception at work.
However, Veitch’s insights also point towards another theme, the way
law organises the legitimatisation of suffering. One of the ways in which
law can do this is by legalising the catastrophe. If a nuclear winter and
the use of nuclear weapons able to exterminate humanity is allowed by
international law, it is not particularly shocking anymore what national
states do to face the threat of catastrophes (Veitch 2007: 121).

Conclusion
In concluding, let us come back to the cause of the Naples catastrophe.
As Bauman has noted, modernity has a strong conceptual link with
the concept of waste. We eventually produce waste, as it is the end of
all economic processes on which capitalist society is grounded. But
together with this, there is the production of human wastes, those
that are out of any social order. While the production of human wastes
is continuous, the dumps are, day after day, getting fuller: the world
seems to be full (Bauman 2004). Humanity is fated not to understand
the moral meaning of the catastrophe until it is understood that, when
evil exceeds certain limits, trying to describe it with the language of
natural catastrophe is just senseless (Dupuy 2005). Catastrophes are,
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in the end, just another expression of the Promethean gap between
humanity and the world of its products (Anders 2003). The aesthetic
and symbolic dimensions in which the catastrophe performs its mise
en scène is a way to reduce such a gap. Catastrophes emerge as large
crime scenes in which law tries to claim control, in constant struggle
between the break of order and its reaffirmation. The State still seems
to be the main arbiter of such a fight. Looking at catastrophes as crime
scenes is a promising direction to enlighten such a role.

Notes
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The author wishes to thank Patrícia Branco, Rebecca Scott Bray, Gianvito
Brindisi, Carlo Ianello and Derek Dalton for all the important insights
and useful conversations, Angelo Ferrillo for the photo reproduced in
the article. I am grateful to the anonymous referees who made excellent
comments and criticisms that helped to improve this article. A very special
thanks to Richard Mohr for his encouragement in pursuing this work. A
first version of this article was presented at the Research Committee on
Sociology of Law Annual Meeting in Milan, July 2008.
For example, the Lisbon Earthquake was, for a long time, interpreted by
religious bodies as the divine revenge of an angry God.
Author’s translation.

Posner holds this argument but forces it to some debatable consequences,
such as absolutising cost-benefit.

For a dramatic account of how this method of reasoning could lead to a
total privatisation of risk with private companies offering an all-inclusive
deluxe evacuation package see Sedersky 2006 ‘Hurricane victims can
evacuate in style’ The Nation 19 September <http://www.usatoday.com/
travel/flights/2006-09-18-hurricane-evacuation-style_x.htm>.
This is the case, for example, of the evacuation plan for Vesuvius’s possible
volcanic eruption (potentially affecting more than 1.5 million people): it
took many years to have a plan but the effective efficacy is dubious also
due to the lack of in-depth knowledge among the population.
For a dramatic account of the story of the Acerra sheep and their shepherds,
the Cannavacciuolo family, see the movie Biùtiful Cauntri 2007.
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8

An impressive account of the fires with ample video coverage of the
situation can be found in the media activist website <www.laterradeifuochi.
it>, where it is possible to see many videos that can explain the situation
better than words. The site aims at making documents available for a public
denunciation of the state of affairs.
At the time this article was written, the trial was still in progress.
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